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Abstract 
Does public policy designed to promote market competition indeed achieve the intended 
consequence? Using the wireless industry as a testing field, this paper examines this question by 
focusing on the impact of mobile number portability (MNP) regulation on competition. We first 
construct a switching-costs model in which market growth rate and initial market structure are 
two salient industry characteristics. Guided by the analytical predictions, we analyze quarterly 
panel data of 218 major wireless operators in 52 countries from 2003-2009. We find relative 
market share gains for small firms under MNP, especially in markets with higher growth rate and 
lower concentration. Yet, surprisingly, large firms still manage to enjoy greater profit after MNP. 
We interpret the conundrum of “market share convergence” and “profit divergence” with 
customer base composition. Our method of analyzing asymmetric MNP effect in a cross-country 
context is applicable to public policy analysis in other industries.  
 
Keywords:  Network industry, customer switching costs, public policy, deregulation, market 
competition, wireless industry, mobile number portability (MNP)  
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Introduction 
Many customer-centric IT businesses are often affected by customer switching, which makes it critical to understand 
and manage switching costs. As pointed out by Shapiro and Varian (1999, p.133), “you cannot compete effectively 
in the information economy unless you know how to identify, measure, and understand switching costs and map 
strategy accordingly.” This is particularly important when government regulations are introduced to influence 
switching costs.  
Our study is motivated by policymakers’ recent interest in reducing customer switching costs in various network 
industries to increase competition. One such example is the Mobile Number Portability (MNP) policy in the wireless 
telecommunications industry. By allowing customers to transfer phone numbers when changing wireless operators, 
it is regarded as a fundamental prerequisite of open competition and a significant driver of market deregulation 
(FCC 2004). As MNP allows customers to choose operators that better match their needs, it may lead to market 
share reallocation. Meanwhile, there is mixed evidence about whether it makes the market less concentrated across 
countries (Global Wireless Matrix 2009). The heterogeneous effect of MNP is a significant research topic, as it will 
help policymakers evaluate how pro-competitive the policy is, and also help firms understand the regulatory 
environment and design customer strategies that are appropriate to specific market conditions.  
Specifically, we attempt to understand whether MNP makes customers flow one-way (from smaller to larger 
networks) more than the other, and if that is the case, what drives the flow. As market characteristics differ 
significantly across countries, in terms of growth rate, cellular penetration, and market concentration, for example, 
“careful empirical studies across different countries are needed” (Shi et al. 2006, p.35). We seek to fill in this gap. 
MNP is also related to a fundamental question in marketing strategy, that is, how switching costs affect oligopoly 
profits. If MNP leads to market share reallocation, it will be interesting to see whether firms’ gain (or loss) in market 
share carries over to their profitability gain (or loss). If MNP increases small firm profitability in addition to market 
share, then the policy may be deemed to have achieved its intended goal.  
These issues motivate our research questions: (1) Does MNP reduce market concentration? (2) Does profitability of 
large and small firms converge as a result of MNP? (3) How do these effects vary across market conditions? To 
answer these questions, we first construct an analytical model that examines how a reduction in switching costs 
affects market concentration and profit. We model a general situation where there are new users without switching 
costs, as opposed to a saturated market as assumed in Shi et al. (2006). In this way, we characterize market growth 
rate as an important source of industry heterogeneity. Together with initial market structure, this approach helps 
uncover how MNP impact may vary across countries. The model leads to four hypotheses about the MNP effect. We 
then test these hypotheses empirically, based on a large panel dataset of the global wireless industry from 218 major 
wireless operators in 52 countries over 2003-2009. We find an interesting pattern of “market share convergence” 
and “profit divergence,” and explain this conundrum through differences in customer base composition.  
Theoretical Background 
Customer switching costs have two opposing effects on a firm’s market position. On the one hand, duopoly models 
usually suggest that the larger firm tends to charge higher prices to exploit its existing customers, that is, the “fat-
cat” effect (Farrell and Klemperer 2007). In anticipation of this, customers will choose to buy from the smaller firm. 
Therefore, higher switching costs will drive down the larger firm’s market share more (Klemperer 1987a, b; Farrell 
and Shapiro 1988). This eventually leads to market share convergence (Taylor 2003).  
On the other hand, larger firms can maintain their market position through switching costs. This comes from indirect 
network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1985), i.e., the larger network is able to provide a wider variety of services 
(Grajek and Kretschmer 2009). This can also result from price discrimination between networks, i.e., firms charge 
lower prices for calls within a network than those across networks (Laffont et al. 1998). Hence, a larger network is 
more valuable to customers; this advantage can be magnified through positive-feedback dynamics and lead to its 
dominance (Beggs 1989). With these two opposing effects, it is unclear whether MNP will achieve the goal of 
reducing the market share of larger firms.  
Further, market shares in equilibrium depend on such market characteristics as the relative number of new and old 
customers (Beggs and Klemperer 1992). In a saturated market that grows slowly, the average switching costs are 
high. This may discourage new entry and reduce competition (Klemperer 1995), making the market more 
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concentrated. If the market is growing rapidly, large incumbents are more likely to lower prices to acquire new 
customers (Farrell and Shapiro 1988), and the market may actually converge faster under intensified competition. 
Therefore, higher growth rate may be associated with lower degree of market concentration. A reduction in 
switching costs, such as that by MNP, may further expedite this process. However, the literature also has other 
contradictory predictions about the role of market growth. For example, some studies predict that in growing 
markets with a high proportion of new customers, reduced switching costs are likely to decrease competition and 
increase prices, since acquiring new customers is less valuable in a dynamic setting (e.g., Viard 2007). This leaves a 
gap for us to explore. 
Additionally, a more complete evaluation of MNP should examine firm profitability. If small firms indeed gain 
market share after MNP, a natural question is whether they also achieve greater profitability. Theoretical models 
predict that switching costs tend to raise profits in various scenarios (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro 1988). Meanwhile, to 
the best of our knowledge, no empirical work has yet addressed the effect of MNP on firm profitability.   
Model  
Based on the theoretical background discussed above, we develop a simple model to analyze the effect of a 
reduction in switching costs on market share and profit. Our model is built upon the basic switching costs models 
(Shi et al. 2006; Klemperer 1987a), and is extended to the general case of growing markets with new customers. It 
serves as a vehicle for us to predict the directions of change in market share and profit due to switching costs 
reduction by MNP under various market conditions, so that we can derive hypotheses. We are not interested in the 
formula per se (the model derivation details are omitted).  
Consider prior to the game, there are K existing consumers served by two firms a and b. Their respective initial 
market shares are
 and a bθ θ , where 1a bθ θ+ = . Assume that firm a is larger, i.e.  > a bθ θ . This “ex ante asymmetry” 
assumption helps us focus on market outcomes after MNP. Also, the difference
a bθ θ θ∆ = − can be used as a proxy 
for the initial market structure. That is, a greater θ∆ means that the market is more asymmetrically concentrated 
toward the larger firm. Hence, this distinction allows us to study the MNP effect on different firms and different 
market concentration.  
When the game begins, N new consumers come to the market and start subscribing to either firm. Assume the taste 
(idiosyncratic preference for a certain service provider) of K old customers in the current period is independent of 
their taste prior to the game, all K+N customers are distributed uniformly on [0, 1], and the two firms are located at 
two ends of this unit interval. Also assume that cellular service is homogenous; a consumer located at x has a 
“transportation cost” (e.g., time spent to get the service) x of buying a’s service or (1-x) of buying b’s service. The 
two firms compete in a one-period game, where they simultaneously announce prices first, and then consumers 
decide the subscription to either firm as well as the minutes of usage q.  
As typically defined in the industry, there are two types of cellular phone calls, “on-net” calls within the same 
network, and “off-net” calls across networks (Ofcom 2007). Let c and mc be the constant marginal costs of on-net 
and off-net calls, where 1m > . Following the literature (e.g., Buehler and Haucap 2004; Shi et al. 2006), we assume 
that firm i provides service according to a three-part tariff ( , , )i ii ijF p p , where iF is the fixed subscription fee, iip is the 
per minute price of on-net calls, and ijp is the per minute price of off-net calls. Similarly, the on-net and off-net 
minutes of usage for network i are represented by iiq and ijq respectively.  
On the demand side, assume a representative consumer has cellular communication with n other people in the 
market. A consumer in network i chooses her optimal quantity of cellular communication with a consumer in 
network j, and has the following optimal value function ( ) max ( ( ) )
ijij ij q ij ij ijv v p u q p q≡ = − , where ,  or i j a b= . The 
total value to a customer of subscribing to network i, represented by iw , is aggregated over her entire social network 
n. Assume “uniform calling pattern,” i.e., her n social contacts are uniformly distributed between the two networks, 
then ( ) ( )i i ii j ij iw n v n v Fσ σ= + − . Each consumer chooses a network according to iw . If an existing customer 
switches networks, she incurs a constant switching cost s (s > 0); for simplicity, the “on-net price discount” is 
abstracted from s (Laffont et al. 1998; Shi et al. 2006). We model MNP regulation as an unexpected exogenous 
shock which decreases s. Obviously, s = 0 for new customers.  
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At the beginning of the game, firms set prices simultaneously to maximize their respective profit iπ . From the profit 
optimization problem, we first derive the equilibrium fixed fee and variable fees. This leads to equilibrium market 
share *iσ , and the difference in equilibrium market share between firms 
* * *
a bσ σ σ∆ = − . Define the “difference in 
difference” in market shares before and after MNP as * *σ σ θ∆ = ∆ − ∆ . Then  
                                                      
* 1[ (3(1 )(1 )) 1]s n v gσ θ −∆ = ∆ − ∆ + − ,                                                                    (1) 
where ii ijv v v∆ = −  is the valuation of “on-net price discount” (Shi et al. 2006), and /g N K= is the market growth 
rate. If MNP is effective in reducing the larger firm’s market share, we should expect * 0σ∆ < . We will call this 
“market share convergence” hereafter. This requires that ( )( )3 1 1s n g sθ< − ∆ + = , i.e., MNP has to reduce 
switching costs below a certain threshold. 
To investigate how switching costs, market growth rate, market concentration, and their respective interaction with 
switching costs affect the equilibrium market share difference, we derive the following comparative statics. First, we 
find that * 1/ [3(1 )(1 )] 0s n v gσ θ −∂∆ ∂ = ∆ − ∆ + > . Therefore, a reduction in switching cost reduces the market share 
difference between firms. In other words, MNP contributes to market share convergence and help the small network 
grow. This leads to our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: A reduction in switching costs induced by MNP will narrow the gap between market shares, leading 
to a less concentrated market.  
The partial derivative with respect to market growth rate is * 2/ [3(1 )(1 ) ] 0g s n v gσ θ∂∆ ∂ = − ∆ − ∆ + < . This suggests 
that the market becomes less concentrated when it grows quickly with a larger segment of new customers. If most 
customers are new, the average switching costs are low. Lower switching costs also reduce the value of present 
market share, making firms pay more attention to acquiring new customers (Klemperer, 1987a). Hence, market 
share tends to converge faster with more intense competition. Further, we have the cross partial 
derivative 2 * 2/ [3(1 )(1 ) ] 0g s n v gσ θ∂ ∆ ∂ ∂ = −∆ − ∆ + < . As switching costs s decreases, the effect of 
* / g∂∆ ∂ increases, i.e., the market share difference becomes more sensitive to the growth rate. In other words, MNP 
will lead to lower market concentration in a faster-growing market. This is because a reduction in switching costs 
and an increase in growth rate have similar effects on market share convergence. This leads to our second 
hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 2: The extent of market share convergence is greater in markets with higher growth rate; MNP increases 
this effect.   
The initial market share difference θ∆ can be used to measure the initial market concentration. First, a less 
concentrated market will have greater market share convergence, because * / [3(1 )(1 )] 0s n v gσ θ∂∆ ∂∆ = − ∆ + > . 
Moreover, 2 * / ( ) [3(1 )(1 )] 0.s n v gσ θ∂ ∆ ∂ ∆ ∂ = − ∆ + > As switching costs decreases, the effect of 
*( / )σ θ∂∆ ∂∆ decreases as well. Therefore, the market share convergence becomes less sensitive to initial market 
conditions in the presence of MNP. This leads to our third hypothesis.     
Hypothesis 3: The extent of market share convergence is greater in markets with lower concentration; MNP 
increases this effect.  
Finally, we examine equilibrium profits and derive the difference in profits: * * * 2 ( ) / 3(1 )a b s K N gπ π π θ∆ = − = ∆ + + .      
Given the market size of (K+N), consider the difference in profit generated by the firms’ relative market share:  
                                                       
* * * 2 / 3(1 )a b s gπ π π θ∆ = − = ∆ + .                                                                         (2) 
We will use *π∆ to represent “profit convergence” hereafter, and predict the effects of s, g and θ∆  on *π∆  based 
on comparative statics analysis. The partial and cross derivatives of *π∆ with respect to s and g have similar 
properties to *σ∆ discussed above (details omitted). Hence, we propose our final hypothesis, which is analogous to 
Hypotheses 1-3:  
Hypothesis 4: The effects of MNP, growth rate, initial market concentration and their respective interaction with 
MNP on profit convergence have the same direction as in Hypotheses 1-3.   
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To summarize, we suggest that MNP’s goal of helping small firms grow should be reflected in both market share 
and profit, and we may expect to find stronger evidence in markets with higher growth rate and lower concentration.   
Data and Variables 
We use two primary datasets to empirically examine the above analytical predictions. The first is a firm-level 
quarterly panel dataset from the Global Wireless Matrix, with 218 major wireless operators over 6 years (2003-2009) 
in 52 countries. Variables used in this study include market share; earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) margin as a profit measure; further, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated based 
on market shares. Second, the Global Market Information Database complements the first dataset with country-level 
variables. These include the number of cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants (Cellular Penetration), cellular 
growth rate (Growth Rate), GDP per capita (GDP), substitute/complementary services such as Fixedline Telephone 
Penetration and Internet Penetration, and demographics variables including percentage of 13-19 age group (Teen), 
20-29 age group (Young), 30-49 age group (Mid-age), and people with high education (HiEdu). 
Empirical Analysis 
MNP and Market Concentration 
We first estimate the effect of MNP on market concentration as measured by HHI at the industry level. For country 
k at time t, its HHI is estimated as a function of MNP in a reduced form with lagged dependent variable:  
          
1 2 3 4 ( 1) 5 ( 1)* *
                ' ,
kt kt kt kt kt k t kt k t
kt t k kt
HHI MNP Growth MNP Growth HHI MNP HHI
Z
α β β β β β
φ γ ω ε
− −= + + + + +
+ + + +
                      (3) 
where ktMNP  is a dummy variable which equals 1 if MNP is implemented at time t for country k and 0 
otherwise; ktGrowth  is the market growth rate; ( 1)k tHHI −  is the lagged market concentration index (a proxy for initial 
market concentration);
ktZ is the country-level controls; tγ  subsumes quarterly dummy, seasonality and country-
specific time trends; kω is time-invariant country fixed effect; and ktε is the error term not captured by the regressors.  
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable induces possible endogeneity. Hence, we apply the Arellano-Bond 
Generalize Method of Moments (GMM) estimation (Arellano and Bond 1991) to control for endogeneity, i.e., we 
use the past value of explanatory variables as instruments for the lagged dependent variable.  
We first restrict 3 0β =  and 5 0β =  (i.e., without the interaction effects), so as to focus on the direct effects. The first 
parameter of interest is 1β , and the identification assumption is that MNP is exogenous conditional on country fixed 
effects and country-specific time trend. According to Hypothesis 1, if MNP is effective in balancing market share 
between large and small firms, we should expect this coefficient to be negative. The estimation results confirm this 
prediction (Table 1, Column 1). On average, HHI decreases significantly by 0.057 (or 15%) after MNP. Given that 
the quarterly change in HHI before MNP is an increase of 0.09, the magnitude of the reduction is substantial. The 
coefficient on market growth rate
 
is significantly negative, suggesting that fast growing markets tend to become less 
concentrated and converge faster. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The coefficient on lagged HHI represents the 
speed of the market concentration adjustment. It is significantly positive, suggesting that the market will be about 
33% as concentrated as the last period. Therefore, markets with higher concentration tend to converge slower, and 
vice versa. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
With interaction effects between MNP and market growth rate/market concentration, the direct effects have similar 
signs and magnitudes as before (Column 2). Further, we find that the estimate of 3β is negative. MNP strengthens the 
negative effect of the growth rate on market concentration, as it further lowers the average switching costs. This 
supports the interaction effect described in Hypothesis 2. Markets grow slowly when they are in their infant stage, 
and when mature and saturated. For infant markets, MNP may not be a salient consideration for customers as the 
markets are usually dominated by monopolists or duopolists (especially in developing countries). For mature 
markets, large firms may have become large because of investment in network coverage and service quality. These 
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characteristics cannot be easily changed by MNP, and whether numbers are portable is a minor factor for customers, 
who may be more concerned about service quality in their decision making.  
The coefficient on lagged HHI is positive. Markets with lower concentration will continue to converge faster; MNP 
further strengthens this effect. This supports Hypothesis 3 and implies that MNP is more effective in less 
concentrated markets. It is plausible that these markets are in transition to maturity. While in a less mature industry, 
large firms tend to enjoy some monopoly power (possibly due to government protection), in the transition stage the 
market becomes less concentrated possibly due to deregulation. In this case, the introduction of MNP may have 
played a significant role in further leveling the playing field. On the contrary, in a more concentrated market, a 
reduction in switching costs may create positive feedback and magnify the advantage of larger networks (Farrell and 
Klemperer 2007), especially in the presence of network-mediated price discrimination. This might explain why 
some markets became more concentrated post MNP.  
Table 1   Market Concentration Index 
Dependent Variable HHI HHI 
MNP -0.057** -0.033*** 
 (0.025) (0.007) 
Growth Rate -0.105*** -0.072*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
Lagged HHI 0.328*** 0.362*** 
 (0.014) (0.029) 
MNP*Growth Rate  -0.086*** 
  (0.019) 
MNP*Lagged HHI  0.130*** 
  (0.024) 
Observations 4687 4687 
Marginal Effect of MNP -0.057** 
(0.025) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include quarterly dummy, 
seasonality, country-specific time trends, and country fixed effects. These coefficients are not reported. Other coefficients not 
reported: GDP, Fixedline/Internet Penetration, HiEdu, Teen, Young and Mid-age. (This note applies to all other Tables) 
 
Finally, the marginal effect of MNP, evaluated at the sample means of market growth rate and lagged HHI, is also 
significantly negative, i.e., HHI decreases by 0.018 (or 5%) after MNP. This again supports Hypothesis 1. As 
robustness checks, we use two alternative market concentration measures, i.e., the coefficient of variation of market 
shares, and the difference between the largest and the smallest market shares in each country. The results are 
consistent with the HHI analysis reported above (not reported here).    
Robustness: MNP and Market Share at the Firm Level 
If MNP decreases market concentration at the industry-level as found above, we should expect similar evidence 
from individual firms, i.e., market shares of large firms decrease, while those of small firms increase. We specify a 
reduced form model of market share, which is to be estimated for large and small firms separately. The choice of 
explanatory variables is based on our previous analytical solution for equilibrium market share, and includes 
switching costs (MNP), market growth rate, initial market share difference (lagged HHI), and prices:    
                               
1 1 2 , 1 3 4 5
6 ( 1) 7 ( 1)
*
        * ' ,
ikt kt ik t ikt kt kt kt
k t kt k t kt t i k ikt
MNP p Growth MNP Growth
HHI MNP HHI Z
σ α β β σ β β β
β β φ γ η ω ε
−
− −
= + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
                                     (4) 
where iktσ  is the market share of firm i in country k at time t, , 1ik tσ −  is the lagged market share, iktp  is the price; iη  
captures unobservable firm fixed effects; other regressors are defined the same as in (3). The parameter of primary 
interest is 1β , the average change in market share over time for large/small firms. The key identifying assumption is 
that differential trends in market share are the same for firms in countries with or without MNP.  
We first separate “large firms” and “small firms”, where a large firm is the one with the highest market share in a 
country at the initial sample period, and all others are small firms. Then we estimate (4) with first-differencing using 
GMM for each subsample (Table 2). Most coefficients are consistent with the previous industry-level findings. 
Again, the marginal effects of MNP show that overall it reduces a typical large firms’ market share by 0.8% (about 
 Wei & Zhu / Pro-Competition Policy in Network Markets with Switching Costs 
  
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 7 
193,000 customers), while increasing a typical small firms’ market share by 1.5% (about 87,000 customers), as 
shown at the bottom of Table 2. Hence, the magnitude of the market share reallocation is substantial.   
Table 2   Market Share: Large and Small Firms 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
MNP -0.053 0.010* 
 (0.066) (0.006) 
Price -0.033 -0.025 
 (0.089) (0.053) 
Lagged Share 0.949*** 0.931*** 
 (0.176) (0.034) 
Growth Rate -0.037 -0.048 
 (0.070) (0.044) 
MNP*Growth -0.241** 0.180 
 (0.101) (0.109) 
Lagged HHI 0.445*** 0.051 
 (0.153) (0.153) 
MNP*Lagged HHI 0.504* 0.188 
 (0.287) (0.146) 
Observations 1081 1865 
Marginal Effect -0.008* 0.015* 
of MNP (0.004) (0.009) 
Dependent variables in all regressions are market share.  
MNP and Profit  
We go on to test Hypothesis 4 to investigate whether MNP affects firm’s profit in the same direction as market 
share. To control for other non-MNP factors and time trend, we model firm’s profit in a reduced form similar to the 
market share analysis. In the estimation, we include those variables from the analytical model (switching costs, 
market share and price). We also include a lagged dependent variable, as it is reasonable to assume that a firm’s 
profit depends on profit in the previous period. Hence, we estimate the following:  
                   
1 1 2 , 1 3 4 5 6
7 ( 1) 8 ( 1)
*
        ( * ) ' ,
ikt kt ik t ikt ikt kt kt kt
k t kt k t kt t i k ikt
MNP p Growth MNP Growth
HHI MNP HHI Z
π α β β π β σ β β β
β β φ γ η ω ε
−
− −
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
                         (5) 
where iktπ  is the profit of firm i in country k at time t, , 1ik tπ − is its lagged profit, and all other variables are defined the 
same as in (4). We estimate model (5) separately for large and small firms using GMM (Table 3).  
For the direct effects, large firms become more profitable after MNP (Column 1), while the impact on small firms is 
insignificant (Column 2). Specifically, the profit of large firms increases 2.9% due to MNP. Given the average trend 
of EBITDA margin is a 0.9% quarterly decrease before MNP, the magnitude of this increase is economically 
significant. Although their market shares decline due to MNP, large firms seem to achieve higher profit. Hence, 
MNP has opposite effects on market share and profit. This surprising result contrasts with Hypothesis 4’s prediction 
about the direct effect of MNP. We will discuss possible interpretation of this finding later.  
The coefficient on Growth Rate is significantly negative for large firms. This means that large firms’ profitability is 
under greater pressure in fast-growing markets. In a market where there are many new customers without any 
switching costs, large firms tend to price competitively to acquire new customers, which may also drive down their 
profit; hence, it is more likely for profitability to converge. This supports the direct effect of market growth in 
Hypothesis 4. The coefficient on lagged HHI is positive for large firms, while insignificant for small firms. Hence, 
large firms tend to become more profitable in highly concentrated markets. This is also consistent with our earlier 
finding about market share convergence, where large firms tend to become larger in more concentrated markets.   
We next turn to the interaction effects of MNP with market growth rate and with lagged HHI. The interaction effect 
between MNP and market growth rate becomes negative for large firms (Columns 3), and is still insignificant for 
small firms (Columns 4). This means that in a fast-growing market, the introduction of MNP further drives down the 
profit of large firms. Hence, the interaction effect on profit has the same direction as that on market share. With 
growing demand and lower switching costs, these markets create conditions that further not only market share 
convergence, but also profit convergence. In this sense, they seem to become more efficient.  
Track 1: Gateway to the Future 
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Moreover, the interaction coefficient between MNP and lagged HHI is significantly positive for large firms, 
implying that in the presence of MNP they tend to become more profitable in highly concentrated markets. In these 
markets, large firms may have already developed sophisticated strategies to retain customers, or they may have 
become large because of their superior quality or broad network coverage. MNP may prove to be powerless to 
change this. In contrast, MNP is more effective in facilitating small firm growth in less concentrated markets.  
As suggested by Hypotheses 1-3, in a market growing rapidly or with low market concentration, market share tends 
to converge faster, especially in the presence of switching costs reduced by MNP. Meanwhile, the market share 
reallocation in favor of small firms does not necessarily bring them greater profit.  
Table 3   Profit: Large and Small Firms 
 Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms 
MNP 0.029** -0.491 0.024** 0.530 
 (0.013) (0.460) (0.012) (0.513) 
Price 0.276 1.935 0.338* 0.689 
 (0.218) (4.155) (0.174) (1.762) 
Lagged Profit 0.191 0.232** 0.287** 0.381*** 
 (0.133) (0.113) (0.119) (0.116) 
Market Share 0.968* 21.240 0.100 6.860 
 (0.481) (14.968) (0.378) (4.876) 
Growth Rate -0.257*** -1.485 -0.217* 1.237 
 (0.069) (0.978) (0.127) (1.891) 
Lagged HHI 0.109* -1.088 0.117* -1.198 
 (0.045) (1.076) (0.057) (1.229) 
MNP*Growth    -0.232* -7.346 
   (0.138) (6.758) 
MNP*Lagged HHI   0.018* 0.253 
   (0.009) (0.386) 
Observations 1074 1766 1074  1766 
Marginal Effect 0.029** -0.491 0.037* 0.114 
of MNP (0.013) (0.460) (0.021) (0.290) 
Dependent variables in all regressions are BEITDA margin.  
Further Analysis: Understanding Market Share Convergence and Profit Disparity  
These interesting findings about “market share convergence” and “profit divergence” raise an important question. 
Why, when switching costs decrease, do large firms lose less than others? We try to understand this conundrum 
through consumer heterogeneity. We probe deeper into firm’s revenue composition with customer base analysis, by 
dividing customers into contract and prepaid (“pay-as-you-go”) subscribers. Our data show that the percentage of 
contract subscribers is highly correlated with the average revenue per user, with a correlation coefficient of 0.729. 
Further, industry analysis suggests that new customer acquisition costs are 30-35% higher than the cost of retaining 
customers (Grayson 2008). Therefore, a priori, contract subscribers are more profitable than prepaid customers.  
A difference-in-difference regression suggests that Contract Subscribers Percentage increases after MNP for large 
firms, while that of small firms decrease (Table 4). This result may imply that large firms improve profit by keeping 
and obtaining more profitable contract subscribers. In contrast, the increase in market share of small firms plausibly 
comes from prepaid subscribers, who do not contribute proportionately to profit.  
If there is such a change in customer base composition, the elasticity of demand for both types of firms may also 
change. To check this, we estimate the elasticity of demand for respective subsamples. The dependent variable log 
Minutes of Use is explained by log Price per Minute as well as MNP. We find that in the presence of MNP, the 
demand of large firms becomes less elastic, while that of small firms becomes more elastic. Further, the joint effect 
of MNP is that a 1% price increase is associated with a 0.25% decrease in minutes of use for large firms, while a 
0.45% decrease for small firms; hence large firms have less elastic demand as a result of the policy. Large firms may 
have more inframarginal customers (contract subscribers) than others, and therefore are willing to lose some 
marginal customers (prepaid subscribers) and compete less aggressively. These customers lost are actually 
“supramarginal,” in the sense that they wanted to switch away from large firms but were prevented from doing so 
untill MNP was introduced. The consequent lower demand elasticity of large firms might explain why they are able 
to sustain higher profitability after MNP, even with market share loss.  
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Customer base analysis here shows that managing customer segments is important for profitability. MNP facilitates 
customer switching, but it does not guarantee that firms gaining more customers will achieve higher profitability. It 
depends on whether the firms can acquire and retain higher-value customers, who tend to be long-term contract 
subscribers. Therefore, marketing efforts geared towards retaining more profitable customers become more 
important in the presence of policy intervention.  
Table 4   Customer Base Composition and Elasticity of Demand 
Dependent Variable (1) Contract Subscribers Percentage 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
MNP 0.041*** 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Observations 1142 2713 
R-squared 0.959 0.967 
Dependent Variable            (2)  Ln(Minutes of Use) 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
Ln(Price) -0.253*** -0.452*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) 
MNP 0.039 -0.051 
 (0.036) (0.041) 
MNP*Ln(Price) 0.016** -0.020 
 (0.007) (0.021) 
Observations 1082 1866 
R-squared 0.998 0.998  
Concluding Remarks  
Switching costs are of strategic importance in managing customer behavior in network industries. This becomes 
even more interesting when government policies are involved. Taking MNP in the wireless industry as an example, 
it is designed to level the playing field by reducing customer switching barrier. As governments and industries 
around the globe weigh the pros and cons of market deregulation, a fundamental question arises: will public policy 
designed to promote market competition indeed achieve the intended consequence? The fact that MNP was 
introduced in different countries at different times, and to different market structures, provides a natural experiment 
that can help inform our understanding of switching costs, the effectiveness of pro-competition public policy, and 
the implications for customer strategy in network industries.  
We believe that MNP’s effect on market competition is reflected in the evolution of market share and profit 
distribution. Drawing upon relevant theoretical perspectives, we construct an analytical model, which is simple yet 
useful to investigate how such a decrease in switching costs affects equilibrium market share and profit under 
various market conditions. Then we empirically examine the impact of MNP on the persistence of market leaders.  
Our analysis has the following features: (1) We focus on market share and profit as two important “non-price” 
market outcomes after MNP, as opposed to examining MNP effect on prices as in the literature. This helps us to 
understand whether MNP indeed facilitates the growth of small firms by these criteria, so as to better assess the 
policy outcomes. (2) We investigate possible asymmetric outcomes of MNP effect, and find convergence in market 
share and divergence in profitability between large and small firms. Although MNP reallocates market share in favor 
of small firms, they are not necessarily more profitable. We interpret this seeming contradiction through customer 
base composition, hence offer insights into potential “winners” and “losers” of the MNP regulation, and the possible 
mechanism leading to this asymmetric outcome. (3) We model market growth rate and initial market structure as 
key industry parameters on MNP outcome. Our global datasets allow us to account for these market conditions in an 
international context. Our finding on market share convergence is in contrast to Shi et al. (2006), and we believe that 
the present cross-country study may have greater external validity. This also provides implications for policymakers 
to consider the timing of MNP introduction, which is absent in individual market studies.    
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by investigating the asymmetric effect of public policy in a cross-
country context. The findings are useful not only for policymakers to assess the effectiveness of the policy, but also 
for firms to understand how to incorporate customer switching into competitive strategies to sustain performance. 
With MNP as a valuable experiment in the wireless industry, we hope our approach can be extended to analyze 
other public polices in other industries; for example, personal data portability in online social communities/banking 
industry/healthcare industry, and network neutrality.  
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